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COMMENT
ARBITRATING CIVIL RICO AND IMPLIED
CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING UNDER
SECTION 10(b) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE
ACT OF 1934
The United States Arbitration Act' of 1925 mandates that courts enforce
arbitration agreements 2 and recognizes arbitration 3 as a valid alternative to
dispute resolution. 4 The United States Supreme Court, apparently attempting to reduce the case load of an overburdened federal court system,5 also
eventually recognized arbitration as a valid method of dispute resolution for
1. 9 U.S.C §§ 1-14 (1982).
2. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.

3. Arbitration is an alternative to litigation. As such, it involves the resolution of disputes outside of the traditional judicial system. In arbitration, parties voluntarily and contractually agree to refer their disputes to an impartial arbitrator. The arbitrator will look at the
evidence and listen to the arguments of the respective parties before making a determination or
awarding damages. Because of the contractual nature of the arbitration agreement, the adversarial parties agree in advance that the arbitrator's findings and decisions will be accepted as
final and binding upon them.
Arbitration is used in a wide variety of business transactions including sale and purchase of
commodities, retailing, and manufactured goods. It is also used to resolve controversies in
engineering contracts, patents, close corporation and partnership relations, franchise agreements, international business, government contracts, insurance, and medical malpractice. See
generally M. DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § I (G. Wilner rev. ed. 1986);
Lawyers' Arbitration Letters 1970-1979 (1981). For a brief analysis of the benefits and concerns facing an investor in the arbitration process, see Note, Federal and State Securities
Claims: Litigation or Arbitration?-Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238
(1985), 61 WASH. L. REV. 245, 254-56 (1986).
4. Besides litigation, other methods of dispute resolution include legal negotiation and
settlement, mediation and conciliation, collective bargaining, persuasion, and coercion. In mediation and conciliation, the third party involved assists the adversaries to reach a compromise
or recommends an alternative for settlement. This recommendation is neither binding nor
legally enforceable. The contractual nature of arbitration, however, binds the parties involved.
See M. DOMKE, supra note 3, § 1, at 1.
5. Congress, jurists, and commentators have recognized that the federal court system is
overloaded. See State of the Judiciary and Access to Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the Comm. on the Judiciary House
of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Burger, Isn't There a Better Way, 68 A.B.A. J.
274 (1982); see also Clark, A Commentary on Congestion in the Federal Courts, 8 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 407 (1976); Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975).
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commercial and securities transactions. 6 In Wilko v. Swan,7 however, the
United States Supreme Court created the first' exception to the Arbitration
Act by holding that violations of the antifraud and express civil liability provisions found in section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 19339 were not
arbitrable.
Since the Wilko decision in 1953, federal courts have expanded the Wilko
exception to include violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.' Although recent Supreme Court decisions have
strongly questioned the continued validity of judicially applying the Wilko
exception to violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,1 most federal circuit courts deciding the arbitrability of 10(b) claims
have not favored arbitration. In fact, some circuits not only reaffirmed that
violations of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 2 and rule l0b- 5 3 are not
6. As used in this Comment, commercial litigation involves issues arising under all types
of contractual business relationships. See infra notes 110-40 and accompanying text.
7. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
8. Federal courts have also created an exception to the Arbitration Act when antitrust
issues are involved. This exception was created by the Second Circuit in American Safety
Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). There, the Second Circuit
felt justified in creating the antitrust exception because of the public policy considerations in
enforcing the federal antitrust laws and because of the complexity of the antitrust issues involved. The United States Supreme Court sharply criticized the American Safety exception to
the Arbitration Act in an international antitrust arbitration dispute. Therefore, the continued
validity of such an exception in domestic United States disputes has become highly questionable. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3351-60
(1985); see also infra notes 126-32 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the implications
of Mitsubishi, particularly in international antitrust and other commercial arbitration disputes,
see Fox, Mitsubishi v. Soler and its Impact on International Commercial Arbitration, 19 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 579 (1985).
9. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77m (1982)) [hereinafter Securities Act].
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982)) (hereinafter Exchange Act].
11. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513-18 (1974); see also Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224-25 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). This section, covering manipulative or deceptive practices,
states in relevant part that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. Throughout this Comment, references to section 10(b) will include issues raised under
Securities Exchange Commission rule lOb-5. See infra note 13 for the language of rule lOb-5.
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arbitrable, 4 but also began creating another exception to the Arbitration
Act.
Acceptance of this second evolving, judicially created exception to the Arbitration Act is growing in acceptance. It provides that securities violations,
which comprise the predicate acts required for jurisdiction under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)15 statute, are not arbitrable.16 Civil actions arising under section 1964 of the statute, which have
come to be known as civil RICO actions, allow for recovery of treble damages and litigation costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees.17 Neither the
RICO statute nor its legislative history address whether its civil provisions
may be subject to an arbitration agreement.
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 18 the Supreme Court rejected the
13. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). The lOb-5 rule states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
14. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197 (3d
Cir. 1986); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1986); Miller v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); McMahon v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Smoky
Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 785 F.2d 1274 (5th
Cir.), vacated in part, No. 85-1310 (5th Cir. May 13, 1986) (per curiam) (en banc).
15. "RICO" is the commonly used acronym for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982)) [hereinafter RICO]. The legislative history of RICO is reviewed in
Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations(RICO): Basic ConceptsCriminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980). See also Bradley, Racketeers, Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837, 838-45 (1980);
see infra notes 31-98 and accompanying text. Section 1962 provides the predicate acts of racketeering activity needed for jurisdiction under the RICO statute. The pleading requirements
for RICO are easy to meet. In fact, "RICO is so broad based that virtually any person who is
involved in a commercial dispute can become a subject of a RICO civil suit." Boucher, Bill
Curbing RICO's Use Advances, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 15, col. 1.
16. See, e.g., McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98-99 (RICO is not arbitrable per se); Jacobson, 797
F.2d at 1202-03 (RICO not arbitrable if predicate acts are based on securities fraud, but arbitrable if based on violations of the mail and wire fraud laws); Smoky Greenhaw, 785 F.2d at
1281 (RICO not arbitrable per se); see also infra notes 159-82, 235, 270-71, and accompanying
text.
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); see also infra note 40 and accompanying text.
18. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
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"intertwining doctrine,"19 a judicially created exception to the Arbitration
Act that allowed federal courts to try all state securities and common law
arbitrable issues together with nonarbitrable federal securities claims. In
Byrd, a unanimous Supreme Court held that the Arbitration Act requires
federal courts to sever or bifurcate the federal securities laws claims and
compel arbitration of all pendent2" state arbitrable issues. Further, the
Court stated that the Arbitration Act requires bifurcation even where the
controversies arise from a common nucleus of operative fact. 21 In a concurring opinion,22 Justice White questioned the continued validity of expanding
the Wilko exception to implied causes of action 23 arising under section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
While Justice White's concurring opinion in Byrd precipitated a split
among the circuits on whether violations of section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act are arbitrable,2 4 the Third Circuit recently further complicated the split
within the circuits on the securities arbitrability issue. In a divided opinion
in Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,2 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that civil RICO claims are not arbitrable
when the predicate acts required for jurisdiction under RICO consist of section 10(b) violations, but are arbitrable when the predicate acts consist of
mail and wire fraud.26 The Jacobson dissent read the RICO statute differently and, recognizing more practical administrative policy considerations,
argued that all civil RICO claims should be arbitrable.27
Whether civil RICO claims are arbitrable when those claims are closely
intertwined with violations of the federal securities laws has not been resolved or considered by the Supreme Court. The issues have created splits
among the federal courts.2 8 On October 7, 1986, the Supreme Court granted
19. Id. at 216-17. See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text for the "intertwining
doctrine" discussion.
20. See infra note 119 and accompanying text on pendent jurisdiction.
21. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217.
22. Id. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring). See also infra notes 134, 143-46, and accompanying text.

23. See infra note 232.
24. See Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1400 (8th
Cir. 1986); see also infra note 195 and accompanying text.
25. 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1986).
26. Id. at 1199. See also infra note 94 and accompanying text.

27. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1203, 1209-10 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).

28. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, at 5 & n. 1,apps. E & F, Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 788 F.2d 94
(2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct. 60 (1986) (appendices E & F provide an excellent breakdown

of various federal courts decisions regarding the arbitrability of § 10(b) violations and RICO
claims).
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certiorari to resolve the issues.2 9

The Comment will first provide the background and development of the
RICO statute in general, with specific discussion of the expansion of civil
RICO's scope. Second, it will provide a brief background of the policy considerations that led to the enactment of the United States Arbitration Act,
and discuss the development of the Wilko exception. Third, it will examine
other Supreme Court decisions construing the Arbitration Act and, more
importantly, limiting the Wilko exception. Accordingly, the Comment will
highlight the Supreme Court's expansion of the Arbitration Act's scope and
the Court's refusal to create a second judicial exception to that act. Fourth,
a discussion of Justice White's concurring opinion in Byrd will set the stage
for analyzing the two related circuit splits on whether implied rights of action arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and their ancillary3 °
issues under RICO are arbitrable. In conclusion, this Comment will discuss
the beneficial aspects of arbitration, the recent proliferation and abuse of
civil RICO, and the likelihood that civil RICO claims and implied causes of
action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 will be subject to
arbitration.
I.

THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS ACT

A.

Background and Development of RICO

Responding to a perceived "organized crime"'' epidemic, Congress exercised its police power under the commerce clause3 2 of the United States
Constitution by enacting the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.33 Title
29. See Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted,
107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
30. See infra note 119 and accompanying text on ancillary jurisdiction.
31. The concept of "organized crime" is difficult to define. Depending on the definition or
the source, organized crime is a "social system," a "conspiracy," a "criminal syndicate," or an
"illegal enterprise" as those terms may in turn be defined. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note
15, at 1013 & n. 15; see also Note, Civil RICO. The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial
Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1106-09 (1982).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have power... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
Congress has constitutionally exercised this police power as necessary and proper on numerous "national" as opposed to "local" matters affecting interstate commerce. See L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-3 to 6-5 (1978); see also Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17
GA. L. REV. 291, 312 (1983).

33. Pub. L. No 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 18, 28
U.S.C.). The Statement of Findings and Purpose for enactment of the Act is reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1073 and states that organized crime substantially burdens interstate commerce as follows:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars
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IX of the Act, commonly known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act,3 4 was designed primarily to fight organized
crime's infiltration and influence over legitimate interstate businesses.3 5
However, despite warnings that the statute may be overly broad,36 Congress
resisted attempts to limit RICO's applicability to organized crime. The
resistance arose primarily from congressional concern over the constitutionality of criminalizing status or affiliation instead of conduct, and Congress'
inability to precisely define "organized crime." 37
As enacted, RICO provides new and innovative legal remedies for all
types of organized criminal activities.31 Without considering the statute's
legislative history, a broad reading of these new provisions exposed defendants to either criminal 39 and/or civil 4° liability for violating RICO's provisions. Moreover, to encourage government and private party participation
in the eradication of organized crime, the statute was intended to be liberally
from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and
corruption; ... (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability
of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstateandforeign commerce
....
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States ....
Id. (emphasis added).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
35. See supra note 33.
36. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) recognized that RICO may be overly
broad and argued that the civil liberties of businessmen, political activists, and private citizens
were being jeopardized by the statute. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1018 & n.55.
But cf infra notes 40, 49, and accompanying text.
37. "[The] concept of organized criminal activity is broader in scope than the concept of
organized crime; it is meant to include any criminal activity collectively undertaken ...
1166."
CONG. REC. 35, 293 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff). See also Blakey & Gettings, supra note
15, at 1017-19 & nn.45-56; Tarlow, supra note 32, at 312-15.
38. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 15, at 1013. The Senate Judiciary Committee on
RICO indicated that:
Obviously, the time has come for a frontal attack on the subversion of our economic system by organized criminal activities. That attack must begin, however with
the frank recognition that our present laws are inadequate to remove criminal influences from legitimate endeavor organizations ....
[N]ot a single one of the "families" of La Cosa Nostra has been destroyed through criminal prosecution ... What is
needed here ... are new approaches ....
In short, an attack must be made on the
source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on all available
fronts.
S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78-79 (1969).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1964. In relevant part, § 1964(c) provides the following civil remedies:
"(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of
this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee." Id.
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construed.4

Civil RICO actions arising under section 196442 of the statute allow for
recovery of treble damages and court costs, including reasonable attorneys'
fees. 4 3 Arguably, these punitive remedies are not allowed in arbitration or
commercial contract disputes.' Not surprisingly, the allure of such attractive civil remedies has rapidly expanded the use of civil RICO in commercial
litigation, 45 and made it a very popular legal instrument for fighting a variety
of fraudulent activities.4 6 Indeed, the list of legitimate businesses affected by
civil RICO claims is extensive,4 7 limited only by an attorney's inability to
frame complaints in a RICO fashion. 48 As a result, the expansion of civil
RICO has affected legitimate businesses and persons 49 which Congress did
41. "The provisions of this [Act] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial

purposes." Pub. L. No 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970). See also Blakey & Gettings, supra
note 15, at 1032-33; Tarlow, supra note 32, at 308-11.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1964; see supra note 40.
43. Id.
44. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 439-40 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). But see
M. DOMKE, supra note 3, § 25:01, at 390-92.
45. Courts and commentators have recognized the "explosion" of civil RICO claims. See,
e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486 (1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985); see
also Rivois, Civil RICO-The Supreme Court Opens the Door to Commercial Litigation,
COMM. L.J. 621 (1985); Boucher, Bill CurbingRICO's Use Advances, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 1, 1986,
at 15, col. 1. But see Strafer, Masumi & Skolnik, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 655 (1982); Long, Treble Damagesfor Violations of the
Federal Securities Laws: A Suggested Analysis and Application of the RICO Civil Cause of Action, 85 DICK. L. REV. 201 (1981).
46. "Fraud" is difficult to define with precision but falls within the proverbial "I know it
when I see it" definition. See Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 657 (1946) ("fraud"
connotes perjury, concealment, falsification, misrepresentation, or the like); Illinois Minerals
Co. v. McCarty, 318 Ill. App. 423, 428, 48 N.E.2d 424, 429 (1943) ("fraud" comprises all acts,
of omission and commission, including breach of legal or equitable duty, trust, or confidence,
resulting in injury to another); First State Bank of Canute v. Thomas, 201 Okl. 325, 328, 205
P.2d 866, 869 (1949) ("fraud" is a generic term embracing all unfair ways by which another is
cheated or unlawfully imposed upon, including elements of duress, undue influence, threats,
and intimidation). The collective use of mail, wire and securities fraud is known as "garden
variety fraud." See, e.g., Hulse v. Halle Farms Dev., 586 F. Supp. 120, 122 (D. Conn. 1984);
see also infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
47. Instead of limiting RICO to traditional elements of organized crime, RICO has also
been used against banks, insurance companies, brokerage firms, government departments and
agencies, state governors, judges, state senators and countless other persons not connected
with organized crime. See generally Project, White-Collar Crime: Second Annual Survey of
Law, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 173, 351-70 & nn.1406-24 (1981).
48. In pleading fraud, rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
"[t]he circumstance construing fraud.., be stated with particularity." FED. R. Civ. PROC. 9.
See generally Bertz, Pursuinga Business FraudRICO Claim, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 246 (1985)
(demonstrating the proper way to plead RICO); see also supra note 15.
49. But see Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 529 (2d Cir. 1984) ("It seems almost too
obvious to require statement but fraud is fraud, whether it is committed by a hit man for
organized crime or by the President of a Wall Street brokerage firm.").
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not intend to reach when it first enacted the statute.
To fall within the ambit of RICO, an enterprise5 ° involved in interstate or
foreign commerce must have committed two or more predicate acts 5
through a pattern 52 of racketeering activity53 within a ten year period. 54 Because application of civil RICO appeared unrestricted, potentially affecting
legitimate businesses more than the originally intended "organized crime associations," 55 some courts began to impose "standing" obstacles to civil
RICO claims.5 6 As part of the standing requirements limiting civil RICO's
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982) provides: An " '[e]nterprise' includes any individual,partnership, corporation,association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. (emphasis added). See also United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) (in which the Supreme Court decided that "enterprise" included
both legitimate and illegitimate businesses).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982). Section 1962 provides the predicate acts for jurisdiction
under the RICO statute. This section states in relevant part that:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income ...from a
pattern of racketeeringactivity or through collection of an unlawful debt.., to use or
invest... any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income in acquisition of
any interest in ....any enterprise which is engaged in, or ...affect[s], interstate or

foreign commerce ....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain ... any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or ...affect[s], interstate or foreign
commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawfulfor any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or ...affect[ing], interstate orforeign commerce, to conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity ....

(d) It shall be unlawfulfor any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of
subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(s) (1982) provides in relevant part that: "As used in this chapter'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity ....which
occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity." Id. See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S.Ct.
3275, 3285 & n.14 (1985).
53. Section 1961(1) provides in relevant part that:
As used in this chapter(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat ... which is chargeable
under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act
which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States
Code; ...section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud),
...section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce) .... or (D) any offense
involving ...

fraud in the sale of securities ....

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
55. See supra notes 31, 36-37, and accompanying text.
56. See generally Comment, Civil RICO: The Resolution of the Racketeering Enterprise
Injury Requirement, 21 CAL. W.L. REV. 364, 366 (1985); Note, RICO's New Community of
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scope, these courts required that plaintiffs prove a racketeering enterprise
injury,57 and permitted a private RICO action only against a defendant who
had already been convicted of a predicate act or of a RICO violation.58
This background of judicially created obstacles to standing under civil
RICO, from courts which recognized the potential for abuse of the statute, 59
created a split within the circuits. On the one hand, in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., ' a divided Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
district court's6 ' dismissal of a civil RICO claim, noting that the predicate
acts required for jurisdiction under the statute must have consisted of prior
criminal convictions. The court also found that the plaintiff had not shown
"injury different in kind from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts
themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate acts, but also caused by an
Racketeers: The Need for a Prior Criminal Conviction Requirement, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 229,
236-41 (1986).
57. See Comment, supra note 56, at 367-68 & n.26. Other standing requirements demand
that plaintiffs prove an organized crime connection, a competitive injury, or an infiltration
injury.
Prior to Sedima, plaintiffs had to show an injury caused by a defendant connected with
organized crime to meet the "organized crime connection" requirement. See, e.g., Moss v.
Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984);
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); Bunker
Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287-88 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1983);
Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); In re
Catanella & E.F. Hutton & Co. Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1430 (E.D. Pa. 1984). But see,
e.g., Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Waterman S.S.
Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 258 (E.D. La. 1981).
The "competitive injury" requirement, eventually rejected by most courts, asked that plaintiffs show a competitive injury. The practical effect of this requirement was to deny standing to
those directly injuredfrom the predicate crimes, but grant standing to competitors indirectly
affected. See, e.g., Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1288
(7th Cir. 1983); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002
(1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("competitive injury"
must be shown); Crocker Nat'l. Bank v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 555 F. Supp. 47, 49 (N.D. Cal
1982).
The "infiltration injury" required that plaintiffs demonstrate that legitimate business entities
were infiltrated by criminal elements through the required pattern of racketeering activity.
This requirement is perhaps the only judicial requirement that complied with original congressional intent. See, e.g., Spencer Co. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,361 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981). See also Comment, supra note
56, at 366-81 & nn.22-28.
58. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 486-88 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd,
105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Rhoades, 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D.
Mich. 1981). The prior RICO conviction requirement was rejected in Bunker Ramo Corp. v.
United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d at 1286-87.
59. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
60. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984).
61. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
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62
activity which RICO was designed to deter."

On the other hand, in Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust
Co.,63 a unanimous Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit criticized Sec-

ond Circuit precedent and refused to limit civil RICO's scope. There, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that civil RICO claims only required proof of
causation of injury, either directly or indirectly, by the predicate acts.'
In the first case, Sedima, a Belgian importing-exporting corporation, had
entered into a joint venture with Imrex, Co., an American exporter of aircraft and electronic aircraft-related components. 65 After becoming convinced that Imrex was presenting inflated bills for orders filled, Sedima filed
a complaint setting forth various common law claims traditionally alleged in
disputes involving contractual business relationships. In addition, however,
Sedima alleged RICO claims under the civil remedies of section 1964(c)
against Imrex. 66 Sedima asserted that Imrex had been involved in an international pattern of racketeering activity in violation of section 1962(c) of the
RICO statute.6 7 Sedima also maintained that this pattern of racketeering
activity was based on predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. 68 A third RICO
count alleged a conspiracy to violate section 1962(c). Asserting injury of at
least $175,000 from Imrex's overbilling, Sedima sought treble damages and
attorneys' fees. 69 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal

of the action.7 ° In so doing, the Second Circuit required that a racketeering
injury and a prior conviction of a predicate act or a RICO violation be
shown before a civil RICO action could proceed.
In Haroco, several businesses, including Haroco, had borrowed several
million dollars from the American National Bank of Chicago. Each loan
agreement stipulated that the interest rate would be "one percent over the
bank's prime rate."7 The prime rate was subsequently defined as the "rate
of interest charged by the bank to its largest and most creditworthy commer62. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 494-96 & n.41. This was a "competitive injury" analogous to
antitrust laws. See generally Brown, RICO Repercussions: Sedima and Haroco, 21 CAL. W.L.
REV. 282 (1985).
63. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984).

64. Id. at 392.
65. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 484. The agreement called for Imrex to supply parts to a Belgian

corporation.
66. See supra note 40 for text of § 1964(c).
67. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text; see also infra note 94 and accompanying text.
69. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3279 (1985).
70. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
71. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 385.
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cial borrowers."' 72 Haroco, for itself and on behalf of the other borrowers,
later sued alleging that the bank had defrauded them "by setting the interest
rate for the loans at one percent over the prime rate and then actively concealing [the bank's] actual prime rate, which, presumably, was measurably
less than [the bank had] represented it to be to the plaintiffs.", 73 Haroco
alleged three state law causes of action and two RICO counts under section
1964(c).7 4 On the RICO charges, Haroco claimed that the bank had injured
the borrowers by charging them excessive interest in a pattern of racketeering activity and had violated the federal mail fraud laws by billing the borrowers for the excessive interest.7 5 Haroco sought damages in the amount of
three times the excessive interest paid. The district court dismissed the
RICO action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The court of appeals reversed. 76 Unlike the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit found the RICO language not ambiguous, but deliberately broad to
reach the racketeering evil sought. 77 Thus, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the Sedima-Haroco conflict.
B.

Expansion of Civil RICO's Scope

The expansion of civil RICO's scope received approval of the United
States Supreme Court in Sedima 7 8 and Haroco.79 The cases were decided
the same day by a sharply divided Court. Both cases involved business fraud
between legitimate corporations whose affiliation with, or infiltration by, organized crime elements was nonexistent.
For all practical purposes, the Supreme Court decided the Sedima-Haroco
dilemma with the Sedima opinion. After conducting its own analysis of
RICO's history, language, and policy considerations, a five-Justice majority
of the Supreme Court held that judicially created "standing" requirements
for private actions brought under section 1964(c) of the statute were unwarranted. As such, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit opinions
requiring that civil RICO actions proceed only against defendants who had
already been criminally convicted.8" In addition, the Supreme Court criti72. Id.
73. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 577 F. Supp. 111, 112 (N.D. Ill.
1983).

74. See supra note 40 for text of § 1964(c).
75. The RICO claims were based on violations of § 1962(c) and on predicate acts of mail
fraud. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
77. Haroco, 747 F.2d at 390.
78. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
79. 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
80. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284. The other Second Circuit precedents were Bankers Trust

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 36:455

cized other "competitive injury" or "organized crime nexus" standing requirements and dismissed the Second Circuit's racketeering injury
requirement."1 Writing for the majority, Justice White recognized the Second Circuit's concern over the misuse of civil RICO by private plaintiffs,82
but stated that the Second Circuit was not alone in struggling to define
"racketeering enterprise injury," particularly as a standing requirement to
limit civil RICO's scope. Therefore, the "difficulty of that task itself caution[ed] against imposing such a requirement."8 3 Finally, the opinion invited lower courts to develop a narrower definition for the "pattern" 8 4
component of racketeering activity to slow the expansion of civil RICO
claims.8 5
Justice Powell, dissenting separately 8 6 and concurring with Justice Marshall's dissent,87 emphatically disagreed that RICO authorized the types of
private civil actions being brought against legitimate and respected businesses in ordinary fraud and breach of contract cases. 88 For Justice Powell,
RICO's title and legislative history clearly prevented the statute from applying to "garden variety fraud", breach of contract cases, and "innocent businessmen" whom Congress did not intend to reach with the statute.89
Furthermore, he warned that the majority's opinion would encourage expansion of ancillary civil RICO claims in federal courts, bypassing the traditional remedies available in state courts for alleged fraud or contract
violations. 9"
Justice Marshall, writing for the Sedima and Haroco dissenters, 9' recognized the practical implications of the majority's opinion stating that civil
Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated mer., 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); Furman v.
Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985).
81. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284. See also supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
82. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3278.
83. Id. at 3284-85 & nn.12-13 (citations omitted).
84. See id. at 3285 & n.14 (for the crucial importance ascribed to the word "pattern"
within the RICO statute in "pattern of racketeering activity").
85. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 & n.14 and part II of Justice Powell's dissent at 3289-91.
However, the Sedima majority failed to recognize that despite any possible attempts to narrow
the "pattern" definition, the ease with which two RICO predicate acts are committed will do
little to slow the expansion of those RICO claims. See Taylor & Smith, Pleadingand Proving
Patterns of Racketeering After Sedima, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 1, 1986, at 15, col. 2 (discussing the
post-Sedima developments to the "pattern" definition); see also infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
86. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3288 (Powell, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 3292 (Marshall, J., dissenting in Sedima and Haroco).
88. Id. at 3288 (Powell, J., dissenting)
89. Id. See also supra note 46 and accompanying text. But see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
90. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3291.
91. Joining in the dissent were Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell.
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RICO's expansion will revolutionize private litigation. 92 The dissent argued
that the majority's overly broad reading of the statute had validated the federalization of extensive areas of state common law fraud and displaced established federal and state remedial provisions to deal with that fraud. 93 The
dissent strongly criticized the majority because prior to RICO, no federal
statute expressly provided a private remedy for violating the federal mail and
wire fraud laws. 94 Moreover, in the securities litigation area, Justice Marshall argued that the majority's decision practically eliminated "decades of
legislative and judicial development of private civil remedies under the federal securities laws."9 5 Despite Sedima's invitation for the courts to narrowly define the "pattern" component of racketeering activity, the dissent
observed that civil RICO was prone to abuse. For instance, Justice Marshall
observed that although commodities fraud is not a predicate act within
RICO's reach, private damages provided for under the Commodities Exchange Act 96 could be circumvented in a commodities case by alleging mail
or wire fraud. 97

Whether the Supreme Court correctly interpreted the RICO statute in
deciding Sedima is open for debate. 98 What is definite, however, is that a
92. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3293; see also Rivois, supra note 45, at 621.
93. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3293.
94. Id. See Note, supra note 31, at 1104-05 (warning of RICO's potential breadth by
pleading a violation of the federal mail and wire fraud laws). Mail fraud (18 U.S.C § 1341
(1982)) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982)) provide that any fraudulent scheme in which
either a mailing (mail fraud) or an interstate communication (wire fraud) is used shall constitute a violation of the statutes. Since almost every business transaction involves a mailing, a
telephone call, or a wire transfer, particularly in the securities exchange industry, the scope of
civil RICO is virtually unlimited. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) (only
knowledge or reasonable foreseeability that the mails or interstate wires would be used in a
fraudulent scheme required to violate the statutes); United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.
1983) (expansively interpreting the statutes); see also Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute
(Part 1), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771 (1980) (Congress and the Supreme Court have approved the
expansive use of the statutes); Note, A Survey of the Mail Fraud Act, 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REV.
673 (1978) (commentators and courts have liberally interpreted the mail fraud statute). Thus,
in the securities exchange markets, a securities trade by a dishonest broker, followed by a
periodic letter or telephone confirmation of the executed trade would sufficiently provide the
two predicate acts required for RICO jurisdiction.
95. Sedima, 105 S.Ct. at 3295 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982)) [hereinafter the Commodities Act]. Congress has made
at least six major revisions to the Commodities Act. For a discussion of the history of the
Commodities Act see Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982). See supra notes 51, 53 for a partial list of predicate acts and racketeering activities
prohibited by RICO.
97. Sedima, 105 S.Ct. at 3295. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Boucher, Bill Curbing RICO's Use Advances, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 1,1986, at 15,
col. 1.
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majority of the Supreme Court refused to allow judicially created standing
requirements to prevent private parties from obtaining the benefits of the
RICO statute. In doing so, the Sedima decision expanded civil RICO's
scope and revolutionized commercial litigation. Whether Sedima will eventually create a second Supreme Court exception to the Arbitration Act is
also an open question, particularly after considering the compelling public
interest in enforcing the racketeering laws.

II.

THE ARBITRATION ACT, THE WILKo EXCEPTION, AND EXPANDING
THE SCOPE OF ARBITRABILITY

A.

Background of the Act and Creation of the Wilko Exception

Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act99 in 1925 to overcome
decades of judicial hostility towards arbitration. 1o Congress statutorily, and
without exception, recognized arbitration as a valid method of dispute resolution for contracting parties.' ° ' Within the securities exchange industry it99. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
100. Judicial hostility towards arbitration has existed for various reasons since at least the
1700's. For instance, erroneously assuming that contracting parties could not resolve their
disputes without court intervention, early English and American courts refused to enforce
arbitration agreements partly because parties could not, by contract, oust courts of jurisdiction. See Note, Mixed Arbitrable and NonarbitrableClaims in SecuritiesLitigation: Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 525, 528-31 & nn.25-31 (1985). Financial
reasons were also involved. Since judicial salaries came largely from fees, English judges
wished to avoid loss of income. Finally, competitive and monopolistic judicial attitudes may
also explain the judicial hostility towards arbitration. See generally F. ELKOURI & E.
ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th Ed. 1985); Cohen & Dayton, The New Federal
Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926); Jones, Historical Development of Commercial
Arbitration in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240 (1928); Lippman, Arbitration as an
Alternative to Judicial Settlement: Some Selected Perspectives, 24 MAINE L. REV. 215 (1972);
Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595 (1928).
101. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). In relevant part, § 2 of the Arbitration Act mandates without
exception that:
A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, ... or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, there should not be much judicial hesitance in enforcing
an arbitration agreement. To prevail on a motion to compel arbitration, a contracting party
need only show (i) the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate, (ii) that the claims are
arbitrable, and (iii) that the right to arbitrate has not been waived. McMahon v. Shearson/
Am. Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 788
F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986). Any doubts as to the arbitrability of a
given issue should be settled in favor of arbitration. See infra notes 111-17 and accompanying
text.
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self, arbitration was established in the early 1800's and remains an important
part of the industry's self-regulation.102
The United States Supreme Court created the first exception to the mandates of the Arbitration Act in Wilko v. Swan. 103 In that case, a customer
who had signed a predispute arbitration agreement °4 sued partners in a securities brokerage firm for misrepresentations in the sale of securities. While
the customer sued to recover damages for violations of section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, "' the brokerage firm sought to compel arbitration as
per the customer's arbitration agreement and section 3 of the Arbitration
Act.' °6 The conflict addressed by the Supreme Court arose, however, be102. See Note, supra note 100, at 525 & n.7; see also Note, Arbitration of Investor-Broker
Disputes, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 120, 122 & nn.12-13 (1977). In fact, stock exchange member
firms and brokers are required to arbitrate any existing disputes among themselves. See id. at
122; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 135 (1973)
(stock exchange rules requiring arbitration of disputes among member firms and their employees are not subject to Securities & Exchange Commission oversight). For a discussion and
background of the industry's "self-regulatory organizations" and securities market regulation
see N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS, & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS §§ 12.01-12.22 (1977 & Cumin. Supp. 1985); Moylan, The Place of Self-

Regulation in the Securities Industry, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 49 (1978); Wallison, Self-Regulation of
the MunicipalSecurities Industry, 6 SEC. REG. L.J. 291 (1978). For a study suggesting possible
improvements in the securities industry dispute resolution system see Lipton, Arbitrationin the
Securities Industry: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 1985 MISS. J. DIsp. RESOL. 151; see also
infra notes 226-34, 248-66 (addressing congressional acceptance and support of the securities
industry self-regulatory organizations).
103. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
104. A typical predispute arbitration agreement used in the securities industry, very similar
to the one used in Wilko, is provided below. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
Written in very general terms, the arbitration clause may cover all controversies arising between the customer-investor and the broker-firm. Courts have interpreted arbitration agreements liberally. See Note, Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes, supra note 102, at 125 &
nn.29-31.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). Section 12(2) provides in relevant part the following remedies for fraudulent misrepresentations in an initial public offering:
Any person who2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted... ), by the use of any means
or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue
statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements .... not misleading... ,and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such
security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any court of competent
jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon,
less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or
for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Id.
106. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1982). Section 3 provides for stay of proceedings where issues are
refered to arbitration as follows:
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cause of the Securities Act's nonwaiver provision, which provides that any
condition, or provision that purports to bind any securities customer to
waive compliance with any provision of the Act or of the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, is void.1" 7 Thus, nearly
twenty-five years after Congress enacted the Arbitration Act, the stage was

set for the Supreme Court to determine whether agreements to arbitrate future securities disputes were permitted in light of the anti-waiver provision
of the Securities Act of 1933. Reasoning that agreements to arbitrate future
disputes deprived investors of the advantageous court remedies allowed
under the Securities Act,'0 8 the Wilko Court concluded that predispute arbitration agreements were not enforceable under the Securities Act of 1933
because such agreements violated the Act's nonwaiver provision. The Court
reasoned that the conflicting provision of the Arbitration Act that mandated
enforcement of arbitration agreements had to yield to the established public
policy considerations of protecting the investor as required by the Securities
Act of 1933.1"9
B.

Expanding the Arbitration Act's Scope and Limiting the Wilko
Exception

After Wilko, the Supreme Court consistently resisted creating another exIf any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration,
the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in
such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on
application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.
Id.
107. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text for the nonwaiver provisions under the
Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, respectively.
108. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. However, at least two dissenting justices
disagreed with the majority's view. Arbitration did not preclude investor protection, and the
courts were not precluded from exercizing their prerogative to judicial review of an arbitrator's
determination. After all, "[a]rbitrators may not disregard the law." See Wilko v. Swan, 346
U.S. 427, 439-40 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
109. It should be noted, however, that the Wilko exception involved an investor seeking to
recover damages under the express civil liability provisions of section 12(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933. Although federal courts subsequently applied the Wilko exception to implied
causes of action arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Supreme Court has yet
to decide whether the exception applies to those implied actions in domestic American securities exchange disputes. The nonarbitrability of implied causes of action arising under the Exchange Act has become highly questionable considering recent Supreme Court decisions
construing the Arbitration Act and limiting the Wilko exception. See Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224-25 (1985) (White, J., concurring) ("Wilko's reasoning cannot
be mechanically transplanted to the 1934 Act."); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
513-18 (1974) (international disputes arising under § 10(b) are arbitrable).
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ception to the Arbitration Act when interstate commerce was involved." 0
The Supreme Court recognized the Arbitration Act as national substantive
law"'. and accepted arbitration as a valid method of settling disputes including issues dealing with fraud." 2 Because the Arbitration Act created national substantive law, constitutionally enacted by Congress under the
commerce clause, the Arbitration Act preempted state laws prohibiting arbitration or in any way limiting the strong federal policy in favor of
1 13
arbitration.
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Co., 114 the
Supreme Court determined that federal courts could decline to exercise jurisdiction of Arbitration Act claims only in exceptional circumstances."'
The Court determined that the question of whether specific disputes should
be arbitrated is to be determined by federal law." 16 Moreover, because the
Act created a duty to honor arbitration agreements, the Court concluded
that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of
the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense
to arbitrability. ' 7
In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 118 a unanimous Supreme Court
held that the Arbitration Act required federal courts to compel arbitration
of pendent" 19 state arbitrable claims if a motion to compel arbitration under
110. Cf Bernhardt v. Polygraph Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (upheld state law allowing arbitration agreements to be revoked any time prior to arbitrator's award determination in case
involving intrastate employment contract).
111. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memodal Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 23-26 (1983); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &

Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-05 (1967).
112. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 400-05.
113. See, e.g., Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16-17; Oppenheimer & Co. v. Young, 456 So.
2d 1175 (Fla. 1984); H.E. Garmo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 101 Wash. 2d 585, 681 P.2d
253 (1984); see generally M. DOMKE, supra note 3, § 4.03.
114. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
115. Id. at 13-19.
116. Id. at 24.
117. Id. at 24-25.
118. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
119. The concepts of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are court-developed concepts giving federal courts subject matter jurisdiction. For more complete discussion and background
of the jurisdictional concepts, see, e.g., Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of FederalAncillary and
Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 759 (1972); Minahan, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction of United States FederalDistrict Courts, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 279 (1976); Schenkier,
Ensuring Access to FederalCourts: A Revised Rationalefor Pendent Jurisdiction, 75 Nw. U.L.
REV. 245 (1980); Note, Federal Pendent Party Jurisdiction and United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs-FederalQuestion and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 194 (1976); Note, FederalCivil
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sections 3 and 4 of the Act was made by one of the parties. 120 With Byrd,
the Supreme Court indicated that it strongly favors arbitration as a method
of settling disputes, including state securities violations. Further, the Court
eliminated the "intertwining doctrine,"'' a judicially developed obstacle
preventing enforcement of the Arbitration Act mandates. The Court also
concluded that the Arbitration Act required compelling arbitration of pendent state law claims even if it resulted in "the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums,"' 2 2 and nearly abandoned
earlier court suggestions that the Arbitration Act was enacted to avoid the
delay and expense of litigation. 12 3 The Byrd Court required bifurcation because of the anomalous effect that the Wilko exception has on federal securities laws violations. Essentially, the Court reasoned that arbitrable state
securities laws and common law violations could be decided in the arbitration forum, while nonarbitrable federal securities issues would continue to be
tried in federal court. 124 In other words, the Supreme Court required that
arbitrable state law claims be severed from the nonarbitrable federal securities claims even if state and federal claims arose from a common nucleus of
25
operative fact. 1
Procedure: Limiting Ancillary Jurisdiction, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 442 (1979); Comment, Limiting FederalAncillary and PendentJurisdictionin Diversity Cases, 64 IOWA L. REv. 930 (1979).
120. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). Section 4 of the Arbitration Act provides, in relevant part, that
courts compel arbitration as follows: "A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or
refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any
United States district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the
manner provided for in such agreement." Id. See supra note 106 for text of § 3 of the Arbitration Act providing for stay of proceedings.
121. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 216-17. The "intertwining doctrine" may be defined as "a judicially
created exception to the application of the Arbitration Act which instructs that when arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims are sufficiently intertwined factually and legally, a court should
deny arbitration of the arbitrable claims and try all the claims together in federal court."
Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314, 317 (6th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). At least two reasons were asserted for justifying this judicially created exception.
First, courts sought to preserve exclusive jurisdiction over the arbitrable and nonarbitrable
securities claims. Second, because arbitrable and nonarbitrable securities claims arose from a
common nucleus of operative fact, courts sought to mitigate inefficiency and expense. Id. at
317. See generally Comment, Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd: The Unraveling of the
IntertwiningDoctrine, 62 DEN. U.L. REV. 789 (1985); see also Note, supra note 100, at 541-47.
122. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 216-17.
123. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 431 & n.12 (1953); Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 336 (5th Cir. 1981);
Cunningham v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 578, 585 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
124. See Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217; see also supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text on bifurcated proceedings.
125. The Supreme Court had first indicated that bifurcated proceedings may be required by
the Arbitration Act in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
20 (1983).
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On July 2, 1985, the Supreme Court decided Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,Inc. 126 There, the Court concluded that the Arbitration Act required that even ancillary federal claims be arbitrated unless
otherwise expressly mandated by Congress. 127 In so doing, the Supreme
Court decided that complicated international antitrust disputes are subject
to contract arbitration and eliminated another judicially created obstacle
preventing the effective enforcement of the Arbitration Act mandates.1 28 In
1968, the Second Circuit had decided that complicated federal antitrust disputes were not arbitrable because of the important public policy considerations in enforcing the federal antitrust laws. 129
This antitrust exception to the Arbitration Act was subsequently followed
by other federal courts."'3 By holding that federal statutory rights may be
arbitrated unless Congress expressly indicated to the contrary, Mitsubishi is
one of the most important cases since Wilko construing the Arbitration Act.
For the lawyers involved in securities arbitration/litigation, Mitsubishi's significance lies in its broad language indicating that even implied causes of
action arising under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act may be arbitrable. ''
Furthermore, the arbitrability of federal statutory actions may also apply to
civil RICO claims. 32 Mitsubishi was decided one day after the Supreme
Court refused to uphold the standing limitations to civil RICO's scope in
Sedima and nearly four months after a unanimous Byrd Court eliminated
the intertwining doctrine. These latest Supreme Court decisions affecting
commercial or securities exchange transactions appear to establish that judicially created limitations or exceptions to duly enacted federal statutes will
not pass constitutional muster.
126.

105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985). Mitsubishi involved disputes between a Japanese-American

automobile manufacturing joint venture and a Puerto Rican car dealership/franchisee. Attempting to resolve disputes between the joint venture and the franchisee, Mitsubishi sought

arbitration pursuant to arbitration clauses in the existing distributorship agreements and sales
agreements. The franchisee refused to participate in the arbitration proceedings and argued
that federal antitrust issues were not arbitrable despite the existence of a valid predispute arbi-

tration agreement. See Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3349-53 & nn.9-13; see also Fox, supra note 8,
at 584-85.
127. 105 S. Ct. at 3353-55. See supra note 119 and accompanying text for a discussion of
ancillary jurisdiction.
128. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3357-60. See supra note 8 and accompanying text for a dis-

cussion of the "antitrust exception" to the Arbitration Act; see also infra notes 177-84 and
accompanying text.
129. American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826-27 (2d Cir.

1968). See also supra note 8.
130. See, e.g., Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116,
117 (7th Cir. 1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974).

131. See Fox, supra note 8, at 585-87.
132. Id. at 585-89.
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While federal courts expanded the Wilko exception to other securities
laws violations, the Supreme Court itself did not question the validity of
expanding the Wilko exception to implied causes of action arising under the
securities laws for nearly twenty years even though Wilko was based on an
express statutory right to sue accompanied by a nonwaiver provision. Then,
in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 133 the Supreme Court again considered arbitration agreements, nonwaiver provisions, and investor protection.
In Scherk, ' a five-Justice majority of the Court criticized Wilko's "semantic reasoning."' 13 5 Although the Court declined to eliminate the Wilko
exception, it limited that exception to the Arbitration Act and held that international predispute arbitration agreements would be enforced if violations
36
of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were involved,
Unlike Wilko, where the parties were investors and brokers, the parties in
Scherk were corporate entities involved in an international contract dispute.' 3 7 Questioning the continued validity of expanding the Wilko exception to violations of section 10(b), the Court, for the first time, observed that
there was no statutory counterpart to the express cause of action provided by
section 12(2) of the Securities Act in the Exchange Act. Further, the Court
observed that neither section 10(b) nor rule lOb-5 provided an express private remedy to redress fraudulent violations of the Exchange Act. 3 ' In
other words, while federal case law had established that an implied civil action existed for violations of section 10(b) 13 9 and rule 10b-5, the Exchange
Act did not expressly contain that right. Whether violations of section 10(b)
were subject to contract arbitration in domestic American securities disputes
was left an open question.' 40 Undoubtedly, an important motivating factor
133. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
134. Id. The Scherk dissenters were Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and White. But

see infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text (indicating that Justice White has changed his
mind on the nonarbitrability of § 10(b) claims).

135. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513; see also supra note 109.
136. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 509, 519-20. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
137. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 515-19. The five-Justice majority also recognized international
business practicalities. As such, voluntary contractual agreements, selecting in advance the
forum in which controversies are to be settled, and the law which is to be applied, were indispensable preconditions necessary to the orderliness and predictability of international business
transactions. Furthermore, a "parochial refusal by the courts of one Country to enforce an
international business agreement" would obviate those commercial realities. Id. at 516-17.
138. Id. at 513.
139. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
(initially recognizing that an implied cause of action arising under § 10(b) exists).
140. After the Scherk decision, federal courts reaffirmed earlier post-Wilko precedent and
continued to hold that violations of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 were not arbitrable. See, e.g., De
Lancie v. Birr, Wilson & Co., 648 F.2d 1255, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 1981); Mansbach v. Prescott,
Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1030 (6th Cir. 1979); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
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in the Supreme Court's expansion of the Arbitration Act's scope has been
the Court's attempt to reduce the case load on an overburdened federal court
system. 141

III.

CREATING UNNECESSARY CONFUSION: ARBITRATING CIVIL

RICO

CLAIMS AND IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING UNDER
SECTION 10(B) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT

OF

A.

1934

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc, v. Byrd: The ConcurringOpinion

The concerns first expressed in Scherk regarding the continued validity of
expanding the Wilko exception to violations of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,142 were raised again in Byrd. Indeed, despite a unanimous Supreme Court decision, Byrd's original holdings on bifurcated proceedings and pendent claims will probably be given little emphasis by courts.
Instead, the courts will focus on Justice White's concurring opinion143 because it became the catalyst for the latest circuit split on the arbitrability of
section 10(b) claims.
Although joining the Court's opinion, Justice White questioned the continued validity of judicially expanding the Wilko exception to implied claims
arising under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Noting
that such expansion was of "substantial doubt," he delineated the major differences between express causes of action arising under the Securities Act of
1933 and those arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1" Most
significantly, Justice White observed that the Wilko exception applied to express causes of action rather than implied private actions under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.145 As such, Justice
White concurred in Byrd only to emphasize that the nonarbitrability of 10(b)
claims question remained open and that the continued validity of expanding
Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 827-29 (10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 833-36 (7th Cir. 1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d
540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 536 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
141. See generally Brennan, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230 (1983); Address by Chief Justice Warren Burger, Annual Meeting of American Law
Institute (May 13, 1986), reprinted in 54 U.S.L.W. 2593 (May 27, 1986); Burger, AnnualReport on the State of the Judiciary,69 A.B.A. J. 442 (1983); Edwards, The Rising Workload and
Perceived "Bureaucracy"of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for
AppropriateRemedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871 (1983); Powell, Are the Federal CourtsBecoming
Bureaucracies?,68 A.B.A. J. 1370 (1982).
142. See supra notes 133-40 and accompanying text.
143. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 224-25.
145. Id.
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the Wilko exception was doubtful.' 4 6

B.

The Recalcitrant Circuits and the Circuit Splits: Will the Supreme
Court Allow More Judicially Created Exceptions to the
Arbitration Act?

In Byrd, the Supreme Court eliminated judicially created obstacles
preventing enforcement of the Arbitration Act. Furthermore, Justice
White's concurring opinion in Byrd strongly questioned the continued validity of expanding the Wilko exception to implied causes of action arising
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.147 In Sedima,
the Supreme Court eliminated standing obstacles preventing private parties
from receiving the benefits of civil RICO remedies or provisions.' 4 8 And in
Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court not only eliminated another judicially created
obstacle preventing enforcement of Arbitration Act mandates, but also indicated that federal antitrust, securities, or other statutory rights may be sub49
ject to arbitration if not expressly indicated to the contrary by Congress.'
The Supreme Court's decisions indicate that judicially created limitations or
exceptions to enacted federal statutes are unwarranted and will not be upheld by the Court. However, even after Justice White's concurring opinion
in Byrd, and the Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi, two circuit splits
have developed in the area of securities arbitrability. These circuit splits
would not exist but for two other judicially created exceptions to the Arbitration Act.
Since Byrd, the Second,' 5 ° Third,' 5 ' Fifth, 5 2 Eighth, 5 3 Ninth,'5 4 and
Eleventh 55 Circuits have reconsidered the arbitrability of section 10(b)
claims in the presence of valid predispute arbitration agreements.' 5 6 Except
146. Id. at 225.
147. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
150. McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S.
Ct. 60 (1986).
151. Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir.
1986).
152. Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 785
F.2d 1274 (5th Cir.), vacated in part, No. 85-1310 (5th Cir. May 13, 1986) (per curiam) (en

banc).
153. Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir.
1986).

154. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986).
155. Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
156. A typical predispute arbitration clause in an investor-customer arbitration agreement
used in the securities industry states:
It is agreed that any controversy between us arising out of your business or this
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for the Eighth Circuit, all of these circuits ignored the Supreme Court's endorsement of arbitration as a valid method of dispute resolution, the
Supreme Court's expansion of the Arbitration Act's scope, the broad language of Mitsubishi, and Justice White's concerns in Byrd. 157 In so doing,
the circuits reaffirmed their post-Scherk, pre-Byrd positions that the Wilko
exception should be extended to implied causes of action under the Exchange Act. l' The Eighth Circuit created a split within the circuits when it
reconsidered the issue and declined to follow the decisions of other circuits
by holding that implied causes of actions arising under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act are arbitrable.'159
Although numerous district courts have considered the related RICO issue after Sedima and Mitsubishi, only the Second,' 6 0 Third,16 ' and Fifth, 62
Circuits have decided, in the same cases deciding the arbitrability of section
10(b) claims, whether ancillary civil RICO claims are arbitrable. Despite
the Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi, which allowed ancillary statutory claims to be arbitrated, the Second and Fifth Circuits concluded that
civil RICO claims are not arbitrable. 163 Although the Second and Fifth Circuit decisions were made in the context of securities exchange violations, the
agreement, shall be submitted to arbitration conducted under the provisions of the
Constitution and rules of the Board of Governors of the [respective] Exchange .... or
pursuant to the Code of Arbitration Procedure of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., as the undersigned may elect. If, the controversy involves any
security or commodity transaction or contract related thereto executed on an exchange located outside the United States, then such controversy shall, at the election
of the undersigned, be submitted to arbitration conducted under the Constitution of
such exchange or under the provisions of the Constitution and Rules of the Board of
Governors of the [respective] Exchange ....
or the Code of Arbitration Procedure of
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc....
Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1394 nn.2-3 (emphasis added); see also supra note 104 and accompanying
text.
157. With little variation, all the cases decided present the same factual and legal issues.
All the plaintiffs were investors-customers with trading accounts in brokerage houses, and all
executed the standard arbitration agreement. All the plaintiffs sued their broker-brokerage
firm claiming that losses in their investment accounts resulted from violations of the federal
securities laws, state statutory and common laws, and various securities industry rules. In the
cases in the Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits, the plaintiffs also alleged violations of the RICO
statute. See McMahon, 788 F.2d at 95-99; Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1199-1203; Smoky-Greenhaw,
785 F.2d at 1275-76, 1278-82; Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1394; Conover, 794 F.2d at 521-23; Miller,
791 F.2d at 852-54.
158. See supra note 140.
159. Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1399-1400. This is the first time since Wilko that a circuit split
has existed on the issue.
160. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 94.
161. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1197-98.
162. Smoky Greenhaw, 785 F.2d at 1274.
163. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98-99; Smoky Greenhaw, 785 F.2d at 1280-82.
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decisions apply to any civil RICO claims. Meanwhile, a divided panel of the
Third Circuit further confused the securities and RICO arbitrability issues.
The Third Circuit concluded that civil RICO claims are not arbitrable if
intertwined with violations of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, but are
arbitrable if intertwined with violations of the federal mail and wire fraud
laws." 6 The Third Circuit dissent agreed that section 10(b) claims are not
1 65
arbitrable, but argued that all civil RICO claims should be arbitrable.
Neither the RICO statute nor its legislative history contain any discussion of
the arbitrability issue. The Third Circuit's decision on the arbitrability of
civil RICO claims created a split within the circuits on the issue.
1. The Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits
1 66

Although the Fifth Circuit was first to consider the interrelationship
between the arbitrability of section 10(b) claims closely intertwined with ancillary civil RICO claims, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is the
most influential court to consider these issues. 167 In McMahon v. Shearson/
American Express, Inc., 168 the Second Circuit concluded that the nonwaiver
provision of section 14 of the Securities Act 16 9 had an almost identical counterpart in section 29(a) of the Exchange Act. 170 In view of Wilko, and the
similarity of the nonwaiver provisions of the federal securities laws, the Mcposition that violations of
Mahon court reaffirmed its post-Scherk, pre-Byrd
17 1
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 are not arbitrable.
The Second Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court declined to reach
the issue of arbitrating 10(b) claims in Byrd and that Justice White's concur164. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1202-03. See also supra note 94 and accompanying text for a
discussion on the federal mail and wire fraud laws.

165. See Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1203, 1206 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
166. The Fifth Circuit initially held that civil RICO claims were not arbitrable. Upon
reconsideration, the court remanded the case to the district court after noting that the Supreme
Court's decision in Mitsubishi may require the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate civil
RICO claims. See Smoky Greenhaw, 785 F.2d at 1282.
167. The Supreme Court has recognized the Second Circuit's expertise in the securities
litigation area. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to the Second Circuit as the "Mother Court" of securities law).
168. 788 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1982). Section 14 provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Id.
170. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1982). Section 29(a) provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or

provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."
Id.
171. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 96.
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ring opinion cast doubt on the applicability of the Wilko exception to implied causes of action under the Exchange Act.172 However, because the
Supreme Court had not specifically overruled Second Circuit precedent, the
McMahon court held that 10(b) claims are not arbitrable.17 3 Yet, the McMahon court made its nonarbitrability determination without any analysis of
the differences between implied causes of action under the Exchange Act and
expressly legislated private rights under the securities laws.174 Had it done
so, the McMahon court may have concluded that the express anti-waiver
provision of the Exchange Act should not apply to implied causes of action
arising under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Moreover, the Second Circuit supported its view of nonarbitrability on public policy grounds. The
court concluded that the securities laws and the implied causes of action,
which the courts have consistently recognized, are designed to protect the
public, and particularly the unsophisticated investor.175 Despite the latter
contention, the Second Circuit ignored the fact that the customers in McMahon were sophisticated investors, who sued both in their individual capacities and as trustees controlling various pensions and profit sharing plans.' 76
On the RICO issue, the Second Circuit concluded that the important federal policies inherent in the enforcement of RICO by federal courts prevented RICO from being an arbitrable issue. 177 The court observed that
enforcement of the Arbitration Act was inappropriate when strong public
policy considerations warranted otherwise. 178 The Second Circuit relied on
its own precedent in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire &
Co. 179 to support its position that civil RICO claims are not arbitrable.' 8 0
American Safety involved an exception to the Arbitration Act in antitrust
172. Id. at 97-98.
173. Id. at 98.
174. Id. at 97-98. Each of the federal securities laws enacted between 1933 and 1940 have
express liability provisions. See generally III L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1683, 16831757 (2d ed. 1961); see also 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD §§ 2.1-2.7 (1985).

175. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98. Although the federal securities laws may have been created to protect the public and the less sophisticated investors, a deregulation of the securities
industry and a reexamination of the basic purposes of the securities laws appears warranted at
this time. Small and unsophisticated investors still play a significant role in the securities
markets, but the major players in those markets presently are the big, resourceful, and sophisticated institutional investors. See generally R. BARBER, THE AMERICAN CORPORATION: ITS
POWER, ITS MONEY, ITS POLITICS 54-58 (1970).
176. See McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 385 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
177. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98-99.
178. Id.
179. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
180. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 36:455

disputes.'' Analogizing to its previous American Safety exception to the
Arbitration Act, the McMahon court concluded that RICO was designed to
promote the national interest in fighting organized crime and racketeering
activities and that plaintiffs asserting their rights under the RICO statute are
like private attorneys-general protecting the public interest. 18 2 Based on this
analogy, the Second Circuit limited the Supreme Court's Mitsubishi decision
to its own facts and undermined Mitsubishi's broader holding that ancillary
federal claims may be arbitrated.' 8 3 In Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court not
only strongly criticized the American Safety exception to the Arbitration
Act, but held that all federal statutory rights may be arbitrable unless expressly indicated to the contrary by Congress.' 84
After the Second and Fifth Circuit decisions, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit considered the arbitrability of 10(b) claims in Miller v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. '85 Undoubtedly influenced by the Second
Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit followed its own pre-Byrd precedent and de186
cided that violations of the federal securities laws are not arbitrable.
Neither Miller, nor the opinions upon which it relied, analyzed the difference
between implied causes of action and expressly legislated private rights
under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Furthermore, the court did
not consider the implications of Mitsubishi in making its nonarbitrability
decision.
2.

The Eighth Circuit

Nearly three months after the influential McMahon decision, a majority of
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit decided Phillips v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 187 and held that implied causes of action arising under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act are arbitrable.' 88 In
doing so, the Eighth Circuit declined to follow established federal court
precedents'8 9 and created a split within the circuits on the arbitrability of
securities claims. In creating the split, the Eighth Circuit considered the
Arbitration Act mandates,' 90 post-Wilko and post-Scherk Supreme Court
181. See supra notes 8, 126-32 and accompanying text.
182. McMahon, 788 F.2d at 98 (quoting American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826).

183. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3356-59
(1985). See supra notes 8, 126-32 and accompanying text.
184. See Fox, supra note 8, at 586-88.
185. 791 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).

186. Id. at 854.
187. 795 F.2d 1393 (8th Cir. 1986).
188. Id. at 1399.
189. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.

190. Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1396-98.
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decisions expanding the Arbitration Act's scope,19 1 and the differences between implied causes of action and express private rights under the federal
securities laws.

192

More importantly, however, the Eighth Circuit declined to limit Mitsubishi's holdings and recognized that any doubts as to the arbitrability of any
issue, including ancillary federal statutory rights, should be resolved in favor
of arbitration.' 9 3 Further, despite the Exchange Act's nonwaiver provision,' 94 the Eighth Circuit concluded that the strong federal policy favoring
enforcement of arbitration agreements overrode any judicial inclination to
extend the Wilko exception to implied causes of action under the Exchange
Act.1 95 No RICO issues were involved in the Philips opinion. Thus, Phillips
pitted the Eighth Circuit against the Second Circuit's McMahon decision on
the arbitrability of section 10(b) claims issue.
3.

The Ninth Circuit

Shortly after the Eighth Circuit created the split within the circuits on the
arbitrability of 10(b) claims, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 196 There, the Ninth Circuit
either ignored the split created by the Eighth Circuit in Phillips or was not
aware that a split existed because no mention of the existing circuit split was
made in the opinion. In either case, apparently influenced by the Second
Circuit's McMahon decision,1 97 a unanimous Ninth Circuit court reaffirmed
its post-Wilko, pre-Byrd position and held that 10(b) claims are not arbitrable. 9 s In making that determination, the Conover court summarily dis191. This Supreme Court expansion of the Arbitration Act's scope also constitutes the
Court's consistent refusal to create another judicial exception to the Arbitration Act. See, e.g.,
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
192. Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1397-99.
193. Id. at 1395; see Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3353-54.
194. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
195. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit court stated in no uncertain terms that the recent Supreme
Court decisions in Scherk and Byrd "have invited a reexamination of the applicability of Wilko
to claims arising under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 ....
We have made that
assessment, and now create a conflict within the circuits. We assume the Supreme Court will
eventually decide this question." Phillips, 795 F.2d at 1400. The Eighth Circuit prediction has
been fulfilled. On October 7, 1986, on the first day of the Supreme Court's 1986 term, the
Court granted certiorari to resolve whether section 10(b) violations and their ancillary RICO
claims are arbitrable. See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986).
196. 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986).
197. Id. at 522.
198. Id. at 527.
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cussed the applicability of Mitsubishi to the issue only to reiterate the strong
federal policy in favor of arbitration. After limiting Mitsubishi to its own
facts, the court relied on Mitsubishi primarily to establish that in that case,
the Supreme Court indicated that not all statutory rights are subject to
arbitration.199
The Conover court then gave two reasons for holding that 10(b) claims are
not arbitrable. First, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Wilko controlled
when deciding whether federal securities laws violations are arbitrable, particularly because of the similarity of the anti-waiver provisions found in the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2" Second,
the court considered the legislative and judicial history of section 10(b)
claims and concluded that implied causes of action arising under section
10(b) have a nonwaivable character that the Securities and Exchange Commission, the courts of appeals, and Congress have all accepted. 2 ' Therefore,
10(b) claims are not arbitrable in the Ninth Circuit.2" 2
Aside from the brief reference to the Second Circuit precedent, all other
authorities and commentators relied on by the Conover court holding that
10(b) claims are not arbitrable predated Byrd and Mitsubishi.20 3 For additional support of its nonarbitrability holding, the Conover court relied on the
interrelationship of the federal securities laws and its own precedent in Fratt
v. Robinson. 20 In Fratt,the Ninth Circuit recognized that an implied cause
of action arising under section 10(b) existed and was necessary to accomplish the Exchange Act's general purpose of establishing federal control over
securities transactions.20 5 Further, the court concluded that because the Securities Act and the Exchange Act are part of a comprehensive federal securities regulatory scheme, violations of section 10(b) would be addressed in
20 6

court.

There are at least three problems with the above argument. First, the
issue is not whether an implied cause of action arising under section 10(b)
exists. Rather, the issue is whether an implied cause of action should be
protected by the express anti-waiver provisions of the securities laws. The
Supreme Court's decisions in Scherk, Byrd, and Mitsubishi cast doubt on
whether such protection exists. Second, it is true that federal courts have
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 522.
Id. at 523. See supra notes 169-70.
Conover, 794 F.2d at 523-24.
Id. at 523-25, 527.
See id. at 523-25.
203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
Id. at 631-33.
Id. at 631-32; Conover, 794 F.2d at 525.
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long recognized the existence of an implied cause of action under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.207 However, by judicially extending the Wilko exception to section 10(b) claims, federal courts are, perhaps without recognizing it, overstepping their bounds. First, the courts
determined that an implied cause of action exists for section 10(b) claims.2 °8
Then, the courts determined that the Arbitration Act did not apply to those
implied causes of action. 20 9 The overall effect of those two judicial determinations for section 10(b) claims is to enact two remedies that the legislature
never provided for, or, arguably, intended. Third, to assert that implied
causes of action may only be addressed in federal court is conclusory:
neither the Arbitration Act nor the securities laws provide that implied action disputes be limited to the federal forum.
Next, the Conover court concluded that the Wilko holding that the nonwaiver provision of the Securities Act precluded enforcement of the arbitration agreement relied on three bases. First, the parties were of unequal
bargaining power.21 0 Second, the Ninth Circuit observed that, because judicial oversight was needed to ensure the effectiveness of the Securities Act
provisions, arbitration was not the equivalent of judicial proceedings. 21
Third, because of the special jurisdictional and procedural provisions of the
Securities Act, 212 the Conover court concluded that investors surrender more
by arbitration than similarly situated persons arbitrating normal business
transaction claims.21 3 Thus, the court reasoned that these considerations of
nonarbitrability equally apply to 10(b) claims.2" 4 There are problems with
this argument as well.
First, although unconscionability is one basis for arguing against contracts
of adhesion,21 5 the argument that an arbitration clause is unconscionable
and should not apply to parties of unequal bargaining power carries little
weight. Courts regularly enforce arbitration clauses between contracting
207. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
208. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
209. See, e.g., McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), cert.

granted, 107 S. Ct. 60 (1986); Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.
1986); Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
210. Conover, 794 F.2d at 525.
211. Id.
212. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728-30 & n.4 (1975),
reh'g denied, 423 U.S. 884 (1975); see also infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.

213. Conover, 794 F.2d at 525. These are the typical judicial arguments to undermine the
enforcement of the Arbitration Act. See Fox, supra note 8, at 589-90.
214. Conover, 794 F.2d at 525.

215. See Fox, supra note 8, at 587-89.
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parties. Contracts between investors and brokers are no exception. 2 16 Second, arbitration is generally not viewed as the equivalent of a judicial proceeding. To the contrary, Congress and the Supreme Court recognize that
arbitration is a valid alternative for dispute resolution. 217 Third, Justice
White's concurrence in Byrd2 18 specifically distinguished the jurisdictional
and procedural provisions of the Securities Act with their counterparts in
the Exchange Act. In Byrd, Justice White agreed that the nonwaiver provisions are similar in both acts. 219 However, while jurisdictional provisions
under the Securities Act allow jurisdiction under federal or state courts, jurisdiction under the Exchange Act is limited to the federal courts.2 20 Finally, while section 12(2) of the Securities Act provides an express remedy
for its violation, section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not.22 1 These differences among the federal securities laws apparently were not determinative
for the Conover court. Like the other circuit courts deciding that 10(b)
claims are not arbitrable, the Ninth Circuit decided the nonarbitrability issue
without thoroughly considering the differences between those implied causes
of action and the express private rights provided by the federal securities
laws.

222

The Ninth Circuit observed that the Securities and Exchange Commission
accepted the nonarbitrability of 10(b) claims in a 1979 Commission release. 223 The release warned broker-dealers that customers must be informed that despite their predispute arbitration agreement, customers have a
right to a judicial forum to pursue violations of the federal securities laws.
The Conover court ignored the fact that the Commission release predated
Byrd and Mitsubishi.224 Therefore, because of the court's earlier summary
216. See, e.g., Baker v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. [Current Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 92,757, at 93,687 (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 1986).
217. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346
(1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); H.R. REP.
No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 111, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 321,
342. See also supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
218. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 224 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
219. Id.

220. Id.
221. Id. at 224-25. See also Scherk, 417 U.S. at 514-16; cf Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430-43.
222. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
223. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 82,122, at 81,975 (1979).
224. One Commissioner strongly criticized the Commission's release as follows:
I object to the issuance of the Commission's release because ... it improperly casts
doubt on the efficacy and fairness of arbitration .... Further, I do not believe that
there is sufficient evidence of overreaching of customers by broker-dealers using arbitration clauses in standard customer agreements to justify the issuance of the release.
To the contrary, arbitrationis an effective and worthwhile alternative to litigationfor
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disposal of Mitsubishi, the continued validity of the Commission's release is
also questionable.
The Ninth Circuit's strongest argument for holding that section 10(b)
claims are not arbitrable is the apparent acceptance by Congress of the idea
that the Wilko exception could be judicially expanded to implied causes of
action under the Exchange Act.2 25 This apparent congressional acceptance
was first observed by the Third Circuit in Ayres v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner& Smith, Inc.226 Referring to the substantial congressional revisions
to the federal securities laws in 1975, the Ayres court observed that Congress
had apparently accepted the view that Wilko applied to section 10(b) because that section remained intact after the amendments. 27 Furthermore,
the Conover court argued that by amending section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to permit arbitration between brokers and exchanges,
Congress "expressly" declined to extend the arbitration agreements to include broker-customer disputes. 22 8 To strengthen its position that Congress'
silence indicated its acceptance of the judicial expansion of the Wilko exception to implied causes of action, the Ninth Circuit observed that the
Supreme Court stated in related contexts "that Congress' decision to leave
section 10(b) intact suggests ratification of a judicial remedy under section
10(b).

' 229

As persuasive and strong as the congressional acceptance argument is, it is
not conclusive. First, the Ninth Circuit ignored the fact that the Supreme
Court strongly questioned the continued validity of judicially expanding the
Wilko exception 23" to implied causes of action almost one year before the
securities amendments became effective. It seems unlikely that Congress
would have ignored the concerns raised by a divided Court in Scherk about
the nonarbitrability of section 10(b) claims. 231 Second, the view that Conresolving disputes which reduces the costs to both the customer and the broker-dealer.
In my opinion the use of arbitration clauses in customer agreements does not violate
or raise questions under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.
Id. at 81,978 (emphasis added).
225. Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1986).
226. 538 F.2d 532, 536-37 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
227. Id. at 537. See Conover, 794 F.2d at 524.
228. Conover, 794 F.2d at 524.
229. Id. The "related contexts" language refers primarily to the issue of whether an implied cause of action existed under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. See, e.g., Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith
v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379, 381-82 (1982). However, the issue is not whether an implied
cause of action exists; rather, the issue is whether an implied cause of action is subject to the
express prohibitions of the nonwaiver provisions of the federal securities laws.
230. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
231. See infra notes 256-62 for a discussion of the Scherk-Congress connection.
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gress' silence subsequently ratified a judicial remedy under section 10(b) as
the Supreme Court has indicated is not determinative of the arbitrability
issue. The well-established policy that an implied cause of action exists
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act has not been challenged.2 32 However, the Supreme Court first questioned the continued validity of expanding
the Wilko exception to implied causes of action in Scherk, shortly before the
1975 securities amendments were passed.233 In Scherk, a mbjority of the
Supreme Court criticized the Wilko exception and ruled that implied causes
of action arising under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act were arbitrable in
an international commercial setting.234 Again, it seems unlikely that Congress would have ignored the concerns of a sharply divided Scherk court and
the possibility that investors may have to submit their federal securities disputes to arbitration. If Congress had wanted to provide for express protection of investors in 10(b) actions, it would have done so explicitly.
Moreover, by holding that section 10(b) violations are not arbitrable, the
Conover court ignored the Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi, and Justice White's concurrence in Byrd.235

4.

The Third Circuit
a. Arbitrability of Section 10(b) Claims

One month after the circuit split created by Phillips, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit decided Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
232. In Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946), an implied
cause of action under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was initially recognized.
It was not until 1983, nine years after Scherk, that the Supreme Court recognized the existence
of an implied cause of action under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act. See Herman & MacLean v.
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983).
233. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513-21.
234. Id.
235. Although Justice White was one of the four dissenters in Scherk, he has apparently
changed his mind on the nonarbitrability of section 10(b) claims. See Phillips v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1397 & n.ll (8th Cir. 1986). Justice
White formed part of the Mitsubishi majority which decided that federal statutory claims in
commercial disputes may be subject to arbitration. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Rehnquist also joined Justice White to form the Mitsubishi majority.
Justice Powell did not participate in the consideration of Mitsubishi. Justice Powell was, however, part of the Scherk majority which allowed the arbitration of § 10(b) claims in an international commercial transaction. As such, Justice Powell may now be ready to allow the
arbitration of 10(b) claims in domestic securities exchange transactions. Considering Justice
White's change of position regarding the arbitrability of § 10(b) claims, a majority of the
Supreme Court is apparently in favor of arbitrating all implied causes of action arising under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The majority would probably consist of newly appointed
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Powell, and White. Assuming
newly appointed Justice Scalia votes with the conservative block, a six-Justice majority in favor
of arbitrating implied causes of action may now be in place on the Court.
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Smith, Inc.236 In Jacobson, the Third Circuit considered whether implied
causes of action under the Exchange Act and their ancillary civil RICO
claims are arbitrable.2 37 The Jacobson opinion is divided into three parts.
First, a full panel of the court reaffirmed its post-Scherk, pre-Byrd position
that violations of section 10(b) are not arbitrable.2 38 Second, a two-member
majority concluded that ancillary civil RICO claims are not arbitrable if intertwined with 10(b) violations,2 39 but are arbitrable when intertwined with
violations of the federal mail and wire fraud laws.2 4 ° Finally, Judge Adams,
concurring and dissenting in part, argued that all RICO actions may be subject to arbitration pursuant to a valid predispute arbitration agreement.24 1
The last part of the Jacobson majority's holding, that civil RICO claims are
arbitrable when the predicate racketeering acts involve violations of the mail
and wire fraud laws, created a split within the circuits on the arbitrability of
RICO claims. Thus, Jacobson pitted the Third Circuit against the Second
Circuit's McMahon decision on this issue.
To decide that section 10(b) claims are not arbitrable, the Jacobson court
relied extensively on its own precedent in Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc.242 To date, of all the circuit court opinions deciding
the issue, the Jacobson majority and concurring opinions together constitute
the most persuasive and analytical authorities on the nonarbitrability of section 10(b) claims.
When the Ayres court judicially expanded the Wilko exception to implied
actions under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, it did so on two grounds.
First, the Ayres court relied on the similarity of the anti-waiver provisions of
section 14 of the Securities Act and its counterpart in section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act.24 3 In so doing, the Ayres court considered the federal securities laws as being part of a comprehensive federal scheme to regulate the
securities markets. 2 " Therefore, if violations of the Securities Act were not
arbitrable as established in Wilko, it reasonably followed that violations of
the Exchange Act, having a similar nonwaiver provision as the Securities
Act, were not arbitrable either.245 Second, the Ayres court relied on Con236.
237.
238.
239.

797 F.2d 1197 (3d Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1203.

240. Id.
241. Id.

at

1203, 1209 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

242. 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976).
243. See id. at 536; see also supra notes 169-75.
244. 538 F.2d at 536-37; see also Conovers v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
794 F.2d 520, 525 (9th Cir. 1986).
245. Ayres, 538 F.2d at 536-37.
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gress' apparent acceptance of the judicial expansion of the Wilko exception
to implied causes of action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.246 This apparent congressional acquiescence, first relied on by
the Ayres court, considered by the Ninth Circuit in Conover, and again relied
on by the Jacobson court, is based on the conference committee statement of
the 94th Congress accompanying the substantial amendments to the federal
securities laws in 1975.247
To analyze the conference committee statement and its apparent acceptance of the judicial expansion of the Wilko exception, the Jacobson panel,
and the concurring opinion, first relied on a Mitsubishi tenet which established that in determining the applicability of the Arbitration Act to a federal statutory cause of action, the primary consideration is the intent of
Congress.2 4' The Jacobson concurrence, relying on Ayres, observed that
Congress amended section 28(b) of the Exchange Act to provide that "disputes between members or participants in self-regulatory organizations, or
' 249
between municipal securities dealers and brokers, may be arbitrated.
The concurrence also noted that "[lt was the clear understanding of the
conferees that this amendment did not change existing law, as articulated in
Wilko v. Swan ... concerning the effect of arbitration proceeding provisions
in agreements entered into by persons dealing with members and participants of self-regulatory organizations. ' 25 ° Moreover, according to the concurrence, the Ayres court concluded "[t]hat the committee included this
statement in amending the 1934 Act . . . suggests [the] belief that Wilko
25
applies to [implied] causes of action under that Act.", '
In addition, although the Third Circuit in Jacobson tentatively recognized
that Mitsubishi controlled when determining the arbitrability of a statutory
cause of action, the Jacobson court limited Mitsubishi to its own international antitrust facts. As a result, according to the Third Circuit, "[t]he
issue presented in Mitsubishi was entirely different from that presented in
Ayers [sic] and in Wilko. Ayers [sic] and Wilko did not involve interpreta246. Id. See Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197, 1201
(3d Cir. 1986).
247. The amendments became effective on June 4, 1975, nearly twelve months after the
Supreme Court's Scherk decision, and nearly a year before Ayres. See generally Moylan, supra
note 102; Wallison, supra note 102 and accompanying text.
248. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1202; id. at 1205 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See Mitsubishi Motors Cor. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3355
(1985).
249. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1205 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st. Sess. 111, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 321, 342 (1975)) (emphasis in original).
251. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1205 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

1987]

Arbitrating Civil RICO

tions of arbitration agreements; rather they involved interpretations of fed' 25 2
eral statutes that prohibit the application of forum-selection clauses.
The Jacobson court, following the Ayres precedent, identified the anti-waiver
provision of section 29(a) of the Exchange Act as negating the enforceability
of such forum selection clauses.2 53 In making the latter conclusion, however, the Third Circuit panel misinterpreted the broad language in Mitsubishi that courts must look to the express congressional intent in a statute
when determining whether "any category of claims" are arbitrable.2 54 Finally, because Ayres had not been undermined by subsequent Supreme Court
decisions, the Ayres precedent controlled in the Third Circuit: implied causes
of action arising under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act are not arbitrable.
Although artfully expressed, the Jacobson majority and concurring opinions are not convincing. First, the conference committee language relied on
by the Jacobson panel is taken out of context, is too limited in scope, and
does not give enough consideration to the full conference committee statement on arbitration proceedings. In fact,
[t]he Senate bill amended section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 with respect to arbitration proceedings between self-regulatory organizations and their participants, members, or persons
dealing with members or participants..

.

. It was the clear under-

standing of the conferees that this amendment did not change existing law, as articulated in Wilko v. Swan, .

.

. concerning the

effect of arbitration proceeding provisions in agreements entered
into by persons dealing
with members andparticipantsof self-regu2 55
latory organizations.
Contrary to the Jacobson analysis, the conference committee's inclusion of
this statement when it amended the Exchange Act does not suggest congressional acceptance of the judicial expansion of the Wilko exception to implied
causes of action under section 10(b).2 56 Instead, the conference committee
and Congress referred first to the Exchange Act, and then to Wilko.25 7 In

doing so, Congress separated, and apparently recognized, the difference between an implied cause of action under the Exchange Act and expressly leg252. Id. at 1202. See also supra note 126.
253. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1202. The forum selection clause language of section 29(a)
refers to a party's preference for an arbitration determination as opposed to a judicial settlement of disputes.

254. Id. at 1202 (quoting Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355). See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text for discussion of Mitsubishi.
255. H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st. Sess. 11, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 321, 342 (emphasis added).
256. Id.
257. Id.
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islated private rights under the Securities Act. The statement by the
conference committee amending the securities laws indicates that Congress
did not want to expand the Wilko exception to implied causes of action
under the Exchange Act.258 Further, by amending the securities laws to
provide for arbitration and self-regulatory agencies, Congress reiterated its
support for arbitration and recognized the significant role played in the securities industry by the self-regulatory agencies.259 If Congress had wanted
to expand the Wilko exception to section 10(b) claims, it would have made
such an intention explicit in the language of that provision. Therefore, because section 10(b) claims are implied causes of action, it does not necessarily follow that these claims are protected by the express anti-waiver
provision of section 29(a) of the Exchange Act.2 6°
Second, Congress could not have ignored the concerns raised by the
Scherk Court when amending the federal securities laws. The Supreme
Court has stated that "[w]e must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against
waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention [would] be deducible
from text or legislative history. '' 26' No such intention of nonarbitrability of
10(b) claims exists, or could exist, based on the implied nature of the 10(b)
claims. Moreover, it is even questionable whether Congress intended to provide for a private cause of action at all for violations of section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act. Despite making substantial amendments to the federal securities laws in 1975, and having an opportunity to clarify the issues, Congress did not amend section 10(b) to expressly preclude arbitration or
provide for a private cause of action.26 2
Third, the Ayres court, and subsequently the Jacobson court, in holding
that 10(b) claims are not arbitrable because of "apparent congressional acquiescence" to judicial expansion of the Wilko exception, completely ignored
26 3
Justice Rehnquist's concerns in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores
regarding the expansion of those claims. In that case, Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority in a 10(b) "standing" case, thoroughly analyzed implied causes of action under section 10(b) and express private rights provided
258. Id.
259. See generally Moylan, supra note 102 and Wallison, supra note 102 and accompanying text.
260. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 225 (1985) (White, J.,
concurring).
261. Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
262. See supra notes 225-35 and accompanying text.
263. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). Blue Chip Stamps was decided immediately after the federal

securities amendments became effective.
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by Congress in both the Exchange Act and the Securities Act. 26 Strongly
criticizing the vexatiousness of 10(b) claims litigation, he observed that
"[w]hen we deal with private actions under Rule lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn., 265
While such growth may be consistent with congressional enactments, "it
would be disingenuous to suggest that ... Congress ... foreordained the
present state of the law with respect to [10(b) violations]. ' 266 That Congress
neglected to clarify section 10(b) of the Exchange Act in 1975, despite the
above mentioned Scherk concerns, militates against holding that 10(b)
claims should be protected by the Exchange Act's nonwaiver provision and
not be arbitrable.
b. Arbitrability of Civil RICO Claims
On the RICO arbitrability issue, a majority of the Jacobson panel argued
that civil RICO may be arbitrable in some circumstances, but not in others.
Before making that determination, the Jacobson majority declined to follow
Second Circuit precedent which held that because of the important public
policy considerations in enforcing the racketeering laws, RICO claims are
not arbitrable per se. 2 67 Further, the Third Circuit majority criticized the
McMahon opinion for not giving enough deference to the Supreme Court's
Mitsubishidecision. 268 In fact, despite the complexity of most RICO claims,
which support the public policy exception to nonarbitrability, the Jacobson
court decided that complexity alone is not sufficient to prevent arbitration. 26 9 As a result, the Jacobson court concluded that with the Supreme
Court's opinion in Mitsubishi, determining the nonarbitrability of statutory
claims on judicially recognized public policy grounds instead of as a matter
of statutory interpretation is no longer permissible.27 °
To decide the RICO arbitrability issue, the Third Circuit again relied on
Mitsubishi.27 1 However, the Jacobson majority observed that the expansive
reach of civil RICO'S scope has been achieved largely by the courts, evolv264. Id. at 735-36.
265. Id. at 737.
266. Id.
267. Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 797 F.2d 1197, 1202-03 (3d
Cir. 1986).
268. Id. at 1202.
269. Id. at 1202. See Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3357. The Mitsubishi Court specifically
stated that "we are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration
and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited ... arbitration as an alternative means of
dispute resolution." Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3354.
270. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1202.
271. Id.
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ing it " 'into something quite different from the original conception of its
[congressional] enactors.' "272 The court ignored the fact that the unambiguous language of RICO itself controlled, without any judicial intervention or
impetus. The Third Circuit then recognized that Mitsubishi required any
exceptions to the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements pursuant to the Arbitration Act to be found, if at all, in the statutes themselves.27 3
With that observation, the Third Circuit, in Jacobson, became the first circuit to formally accept and establish that Mitsubishi controls in deciding
whether a federal statutory claim should be arbitrable. Jacobson accepted
the Court's holding in Mitsubishi without limiting the Mitsubishi decision to
its own facts. Moreover, the Jacobson court accurately observed that unlike
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, "RICO contains no anti-waiver
provision., 274 Thus, because of the extensive reach of civil RICO, and because neither the RICO language itself nor its legislative history suggest that
Congress ever considered the arbitrability of civil RICO claims, it logically
follows that, based on Mitsubishi, the Third Circuit would hold civil RICO
claims to be subject to contract arbitration. But this did not occur.
To decide whether RICO claims are arbitrable, the Jacobson majority considered the RICO statute itself and the predicate federal statutes that it
cross-references. 275 The Third Circuit majority concluded that since 10(b)
claims have been "definitively construed" as precluding arbitration based
upon the nonwaiver provision found in the Exchange Act, ancillary civil
RICO claims inextricably intertwined with those Exchange Act violations
are not arbitrable.2 76 However, ancillary civil RICO claims predicated on
violations of the federal mail and wire fraud laws are arbitrable.2 7 The federal mail and wire fraud laws, like RICO, do not contain any nonwaiver
provisions.2 78 In other words, presumably any federal statute containing
what could be considered an anti-waiver provision would preclude arbitration of civil RICO. If the federal statute contains no anti-waiver provision,
civil RICO claims would be arbitrable.
The inconsistent reasoning of the Third Circuit panel deciding the arbi272. Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3287 (1985)).

273. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1202; Mitsubishi, 105 S. Ct. at 3355.
274. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1202.
275. Id. at 1202-03. In cross-referencing to predicate federal statutes rather than predicate
acts, the court unnecessarily limited the civil RICO provisions to federal statutory claims,
ignoring the common law claims also provided for under RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) for a
list of predicate crimes and statutes that comprise the required "racketeering activities" under
RICO; see also supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
276. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1203.
277. Id. at 1202-03.
278. Id. at 1203.
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trability of 10(b) violations and their ancillary civil RICO claims apparently
escaped the Jacobson majority. First, the Third Circuit had limited Mitsubishi to its facts when holding that 10(b) claims are not arbitrable.2 7 9 Then,
the court criticized the Second Circuit for not giving Mitsubishi enough deference and recognized that Mitsubishi controlled when determining whether
civil RICO should be arbitrable.2 8 ° However, Jacobson established that, despite the absence of a nonwaiver provision in the RICO language or its legislative history, the arbitrability of civil RICO claims depended on the
arbitrability of the cross-referenced statutes.28 ' In doing so, the Third Circuit majority ignored the fact that neither RICO nor Mitsubishi required an
inter-dependency among the statutes to determine whether arbitrable issues
exist. In fact, the opposite is true: each statute or its legislative history is to
provide expressly for the arbitrability of its provisions. Moreover, the
court's circular reasoning ignored the fact that with regard to statutorily
implied causes of action, any statutorily express nonwaiver provisions could
not literally or logically apply.2 82
The Jacobson dissent recognized the inconsistency of the majority's reasoning on the RICO arbitrability issue. 283 The dissent recognized that Mitsubishi indicated that federal statutory claims may be subject to arbitration
agreements absent express congressional intent. 2 84 The dissent further acknowledged that neither RICO, nor its legislative history, barred arbitration
of civil RICO claims.28 5 Thus, after criticizing the Second Circuit's McMahon decision and questioning the continued validity of that circuit's American Safety exception, the dissent concluded that all civil RICO claims
should be subject to arbitration.2 86 The dissent disagreed with the majority's
interdependency requirement for determining the arbitrability of civil RICO
claims.287 Moreover, the dissent concluded that "[a] private right of action
unique and separate claim to which the Arbitration Act
under RICO is a 288
applies."
logically
279. Id. at 1201-02.
280. Id. at 1202-03.
281. Id.
282. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 225 (1975) (White, J.,

concurring).
283. Jacobson, 797 F.2d at 1203 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Judge Adams concurred in the nonarbitrability of 10(b) claims. Id. at 1206.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1207-09.
1207-08.
1208-10.
1209-10.
1209.
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THE CASE FOR ARBITRABILITY

In Wilko v. Swan, two statutes and two conflicting statutory provisions
reached the Supreme Court.289 First, the Arbitration Act mandated without
exception that arbitration agreements be enforced like other contracts.290
Second, the Securities Act of 1933 voided any provision or stipulation binding customers to waive compliance with express provisions of the Act. 291
Considering that the Supreme Court has twice questioned the continued validity of judicially expanding the Wilko exception to implied causes of action, 29g there is little doubt that 10(b) claims will be subject to contract
arbitration soon.
As to the arbitrability of civil RICO, one must consider that three conflicting statutory provisions have reached the Supreme Court. First, there is
the significantly expanded scope of the Arbitration Act requiring that courts
enforce arbitration agreements.2 93 Second, the anti-waiver provision of the
Exchange Act was expanded to preclude arbitration of highly criticized implied causes of action arising under section 10(b).294 Third, there exists the
significantly expanded scope of the RICO statute that has no anti-waiver
provision and allows private parties to act as private attorneys-general in
enforcing the racketeering laws.2 95 However, unlike the Arbitration Act or
the Exchange Act, the RICO statute contains an express requirement that it
is to be liberally construed to effectuate its provisions.2 96 Thus, the issue
appears to be whether the "liberally construed" provision of the RICO statute, when intertwined with implied causes of action under section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act, sufficiently combine to permit creating a second judicial
exception to the Arbitration Act.
The nonarbitrability of civil RICO claims is subject to serious doubt. In
Sedima, a majority of the Supreme Court recognized that RICO has grown
far beyond the original intent of its enactment. 297 Based upon the unambiguous statutory language, however, the Court felt compelled to eliminate judicially created obstacles preventing RICO's enforcement.29 8 It can be
argued that the reluctant expansion of civil RICO's scope, an overloaded
federal court docket, and the vexatious RICO litigation that resulted after
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
Id. at 429. See supra note 101 for relevant text of the Arbitration Act.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430.
See supra notes 133-40, 143-46 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110-41 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 166-76, 185-86, 196-98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3287 (1985).
Id.
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enactment of the RICO statute and the Sedima decision, would suffice to
convince a majority of the Supreme Court to arbitrate civil RICO claims.
There are, however, at least four reasons strongly supporting the conclusion that civil RICO claims are not arbitrable. First, RICO's liberal construction clause requires that the RICO statute be broadly interpreted to
effectuate its provisions.29 9 The concern with allowing civil RICO claims to
be settled by arbitration is that arbitrators may not "liberally" construe the
RICO statute, thereby undermining the statute's remedial purposes. Second, as in Wilko, section 1964(c) of the RICO statute provides an express
cause of action to plaintiffs suffering a legally cognizable RICO injury."
Third, an important public policy interest exists in enforcing the racketeering laws. To allow arbitration of civil RICO claims may undermine private
enforcement of those laws.3 ° 1 Finally, because of the complexity of RICO
claims, a fear arises that arbitrators may ignore the civil provisions of the
RICO statute when making their arbitration determinations.3 "2
The concerns supporting the arguments against arbitrability of civil RICO
claims do not suffice to create a judicial exception to the clear mandates of
the Arbitration Act. First, RICO's liberal construction clause does not expressly indicate that only federal courts are capable of broadly interpreting
the RICO statute.30 3 As a result, arbitrators may also properly consider the
issue. Second, although the Wilko plaintiff relied on the express cause of
action provided by section 12(2) of the Securities Act to address his concerns, a majority of the Supreme Court decided to create the Wilko exception to the Arbitration Act because of the emphasis the Court placed on the
nonwaiver provision found in section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933.30
The RICO statute also provides for an express cause of action for private
plaintiffs.30" Unlike Wilko, however, the RICO statute contains no antiwaiver provision.30 6 Further, Mitsubishi established that all federal statutory rights may be arbitrable absent an express statement to the contrary by
Congress.30 7 Neither the RICO statute nor its legislative history address the
299. See supra note 41.
300. See supra note 40.
301. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express Co., 788 F.2d 94, 98-99 (2d Cir. 1986).

302. See M.

DOMKE,

supra note 3, §§ 12:00-12:02, at 151-59.

303. See supra note 41.
304. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.

305. See supra note 40.
306. See Jacobsen v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 797 F.2d 1197, 1207-08 (3d
Cir. 1986) (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[n]o indication that Congress intended to exempt Rico actions from the provisions of the Arbitration Act").
307. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
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arbitrability of its civil provision. Thus, it may be argued that under Mitsubishi civil RICO expressly permits arbitration.
Third, the Supreme Court has indicated that judicial limitations or exceptions to duly enacted federal statutes are unwarranted. In Sedima, the
Supreme Court criticized and eliminated judicially created standing obstacles preventing private plaintiffs from gaining access to the RICO statute.3 °8
To conclude that civil RICO claims are not arbitrable would create an inconsistent judicial exception to the Arbitration Act. Further, the overall impact of determining that civil RICO claims are not arbitrable would
undermine the practical effects of the Mitsubishi decision and the other
Supreme Court cases favoring arbitration of commercial disputes. Fourth,
Mitsubishi criticized the American Safety exception to the Arbitration
Act.3 9 In so doing, the Supreme Court impliedly established that neither
complexity nor public policy considerations in enforcing the racketeering
laws suffice to create a second Supreme Court exception to the Arbitration
Act.
The important public interest in battling organized crime will continue to
be served if civil RICO claims are arbitrated. First, arbitration will not preclude private plaintiffs from continuing to bring RICO actions against dishonest brokers or businessmen following arbitration proceedings. Second,
because arbitrators may not disregard the law,310 arbitrators may award
treble damages and attorneys' fees in appropriate commercial or securities
cases involving civil RICO claims. Courts are not precluded from reviewing
arbitration awards at the time of enforcement. The Supreme Court recognized that arbitration awards should not be given collateral estoppel or
preclusive effect on federal statutory rights.3 ' As a result, neither the liberal
construction provision of RICO, nor the anti-waiver provision of the Exchange Act justify undermining the established Arbitration Act mandates.
Ancillary civil RICO claims should be arbitrable issues.
V.

CONCLUSION

If used properly, arbitration provides a quick and relatively inexpensive
308. See supra notes 56-58, 80-81.
309. Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3355-59
(1985).
310. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 440 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 108 and accompanying text. But see M. DOMKE, supra note 3, § 25:01, at 390-92.
311. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287-91 (1984) (federal courts

not required to give res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to arbitration awards, particularly
when a federal statutory cause of action is involved in a noncommercial dispute). McDonald
involved arbitration of civil rights issues.
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alternative to dispute resolution. Further, considering the overloaded federal court system, the Supreme Court and Congress have accepted arbitration not only as a method of settling disputes, but also as a promising tool
for reducing the federal courts' work load. Undoubtedly, one of the motivating factors in requiring the arbitrability of pendent and ancillary claims is
the Supreme Court's attempt to relieve the pressure from that congested federal court docket.
Any benefits derived from Byrd and Mitsubishi in reducing the federal
courts' work load by requiring pendent and ancillary claims to be arbitrated
may be entirely undermined by Sedima; particularly if the Supreme Court
decides that civil RICO claims are not arbitrable. In Sedima, the Supreme
Court felt compelled by the unambiguous RICO language to eliminate judicially created obstacles preventing enforcement of that federal statute. In so
doing, the Supreme Court revolutionized commercial litigation and permitted the continued growth of vexatious civil RICO litigation. However, the
Supreme Court probably did not intend to undermine the Arbitration Act as
well.
With the exception of the Eighth Circuit, the circuits that have decided
the nonarbitrability of implied causes of action arising under section 10(b),
and those that have decided the nonarbitrability of civil RICO claims, have
disregarded the Supreme Court's expansion of the Arbitration Act's scope.
Those courts also have given little weight to the practical policy and administrative considerations behind the Supreme Court arbitration decisions.
With the Third Circuit decision in Jacobson, the securities and RICO arbitrability issues were further confused and complicated.
The Supreme Court is soon to decide these complicated arbitration issues.
The Court will probably decide that implied causes of action arising under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 should be arbitrable.
To make that determination, the Court will consider the following factors.
First, when Congress wished to provide a remedy for violations of the federal securities laws it did so expressly. Second, Congress recognizes and supports the role of the self-regulatory organizations in the securities exchange
markets. Arbitration would promote that role. Finally, the Court will consider its own expansion of the Arbitration Act in cases such as Scherk, Byrd,
and Mitsubishi. And, unless the Supreme Court retracts some of the broad
language of Mitsubishi, ancillary civil RICO claims may be arbitrable as
well.
Miguel A. Vaca

